Chapter 7

Why Motivation Only Sometimes Affects Base-Rate Sensitivity: The Mediating Role of Representations on Adaptive Performance

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INTRODUCTION

In making optimal choices in an uncertain world, a problem-solver must pay attention to the base-rates of success of each of the possible choices: the past success rates are usually good indicators of future success rates. For example, travel routes that were generally congested in the past are likely to be congested in the future. While one often finds base-rate insensitivity when base-rates are presented verbally in textual problems (Ginossar & Trope, 1987; Tversky & Kahneman, 1982), one usually finds extremely good base-rate sensitivity in experiential paradigms (Estes, Campbell, Hatsopoulos, & Hurwitz, 1989; Maddox, 1995). That is, when problem-solvers experience many decisions during problem solving, they are typically very sensitive to the base-rates of success that they have experienced. However, there are a few well-documented exceptions to this general trend of good base-rate sensitivity (Goodie & Fantino, 1995, 1996; Medin & Edelson, 1988).

A challenge for psychology (and cognitive science more generally) is to come up with models that explain why and to what degree one observes base-rate sensitivity (or base-rate neglect). One model of optimum choice is embedded in the ACT-R cognitive architecture (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), and it is a cognitively more plausible and specified variant of Subjective Expected Utility theory (MacCrimmon & Larsson, 1979). This model assumes each choice is evaluated according to a PG – C computation, in which P is the expected probability of achieving the current goal if that choice is taken, G is the value of achieving the goal (in some psychological units, perhaps the amount of effort one is willing to spend on achieving the goal), and C is the expected amount of effort that would be required if that choice were taken. For each choice given to a decision-maker, a PG – C value is computed (i.e., P times G minus C), and the choice with the highest value is selected.

Note that this approach represents the impact of base-rates of success in terms of P—choices with higher rates of success have higher P values and thus a higher PG – C value. If followed strictly, this would produce perfect base-rate sensitivity in that the choices with higher base-rates of success would always be chosen. This perfect base-rate sensitivity is clearly not a good model of human choice because human choice typically displays approximate base-rate matching. For example, when choosing between two choices A and B, if A is the successful choice 60% of the time, then humans will come to select A about 60% of the time. If A is the successful choice 80% of the time, then humans will come to select A about 80% of the time. The ACT-R choice model captures this base-rate matching performance through stochasticity (i.e., a noise amount) added to the estimation of each PG – C. People cannot compute these values perfectly, especially since they appear to perform these computations rapidly and implicitly, and thus it is plausible that there is significant stochasticity or imperfection in these computations.

With these assumptions, the ACT-R choice model has fit a variety of choice data (Anderson, Lebiere, & Lovett, 1998; Lovett & Anderson, 1996). In particular, the model accounts for why there is approximate base-rate matching, and why this is just an approximation (because it modified by the particular values of G and C). The model predicts (correctly) that when the cost of one of the choices increases significantly, there will be systematic deviations from base-rate matching.

The model also makes another prediction that has received mixed support, and that is about the role of motivation. In theory, G is supposed to represent the value of achieving the
goal. Thus, in theory, raising motivation levels for achieving the goal should make people more sensitive to differences in P (because P and G multiply in the equation), and thus raising motivation levels should increase preferences for the more successful choice. Lovett et al. (1998) report one study that found that paying participants did indeed systematically increase base-rate sensitivity, and were able to model this result using the ACT-R choice model. This is a common result and agrees with commonsense expectations: when you care more about the outcome, you pay more attention to which choice is more likely to get you the desired outcome. However, this result is not always obtained. For example, Goodie and Fantino (1995) found no effect of a motivation manipulation (again paying participants) on base-rate sensitivity.

Thus, overall, there are mixed findings about whether one finds that people are sensitive to base-rates, and when sensitive, how they react to various manipulations, for example, like motivation level. Recently Lovett and Schunn (1999) proposed RCCL (pronounced "ReCyCLe") as a framework for providing additional insight into these deviations from normative models like those of the ACT-R choice model.

RCCL specifies how task representations can influence choice in experiential base-rate situations. The four main stages of processing in RCCL are: (i) Represent the task, (ii) Construct a set of action strategies consistent with that task representation, (iii) Choose among those strategies according to their success rates, and (iv) Learn new success rates for the strategies based on experience. The primary theme underlying RCCL is that a task representation constrains the set of strategies an individual will use for taking actions in the task environment. Making choices according to the learned success rates of a certain set of strategies enables RCCL to produce base-rate sensitivity or base-rate neglect in direct-experience situations; sensitivity arises only when the constructed strategies include stimulus features that are important to success in the task. The RCCL framework also includes recycling through the above processes when the current representation and strategies lead to low success rates. This implies that an individual’s task representation and strategy set need not be static but rather can develop with experience.

At this level of description, the components of RCCL may seem intuitive to the point of being obvious: how else could it be done? However, the central contribution of RCCL may be to forefront processes that are highly likely to be going on yet have been ignored in previous accounts of human choice processes. For example, in describing human choice, rarely does one discuss the role of representations, nor consider the possibility that representations change with experience. Moreover, there are accounts of choice processes that do not invoke (and perhaps even deny) the role of mental representations (Goodie & Fantino, 1995, 2000).

Lovett and Schunn (1999) described two experiments that provided empirical support for the RCCL framework. In one experiment, they showed that people prefer representations and strategies that make use of information predictive of successful problem solutions. In the second experiment, they demonstrated that one could change the superficial characteristics of the task environment such that participants would prefer one representation or another, and that this manipulation determined what base-rates participants would learn. Thus, there is now an account of why one sometimes observes base-rate sensitivity and why one sometimes does not: it depends upon whether the feature over which the base-rates occur are represented by the decision maker.

The current chapter seeks to explore the issue of motivation: why it sometimes impacts base-rate sensitivity and why it sometimes does not. The chapter uses the RCCL framework
to provide a potential explanation, and then presents an experiment that tests the RCCL explanation.

**PREDICTING THE EFFECTS OF MOTIVATION ON BASE-RATE SENSITIVITY**

Briefly, the insight from the RCCL for predicting the effects of motivation on base-rate sensitivity is to examine the effects of performance motivation in a problem-solving context. That is, there are different problem-solving strategies that one can use. The selection of a strategy may be affected by motivation levels if they are differentially difficult or effortful to use. Different strategies may involve different representations. Thus, motivations levels may impact strategy choice, which may impact which representations are selected. If base-rates are defined relative to some feature, then base-rate sensitivity may disappear if a strategy is adopted that no longer represents the feature in question. This explanation will be explained in more detail below. Although the RCCL model is the source of inspiration, the prediction is actually general to any strategy-based account of choice processes (e.g., ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), SAC (Schunn, Reder, Nhouyvanisvong, Richards, & Stroffolino, 1997), or ASCM (Siegler & Shipley, 1995)).

To understand the details of why one sometimes obtains effects of motivation on base-rate sensitivity, one needs to distinguish between simple and complex choice situations. In a simple choice situation there is a direct, one-to-one mapping between the person's strategies and external alternatives. That is, one can adequately describe the person's strategies in terms of simple external choices. For example, when presented with a left and right button to press, the person probably represents the choice strategies as Select-Right and Select-Left. By contrast, in a complex choice situation, there is not a simple mapping between strategies and external alternatives. That is, a given strategy might map onto different external alternatives on different trials; two different strategies may map onto the same external alternative on the given trial.

In very simple choice situations, strategy-based and non-strategy-based accounts make very similar predictions about the effects of motivation on base-rate sensitivity. The greater the value of a success, the more participants (human or otherwise) will prefer the more successful choice (Anderson et al., 1998). In other words, greater motivation levels should produce higher base-rate sensitivity.

In complex problem-solving situations, however, strategy-based approaches (like RCCL) and non-strategy-based accounts make different predictions regarding the effects of motivation. First, accounts like RCCL predict shifts in strategy choice as a function of motivation changes when the strategies vary in terms of effort and success. That is, it is the selection among strategies (rather than externally defined alternatives) that is directly influenced by motivation. This prediction is easily formalized using various forms of expected utility theory (e.g., see Anderson et al., 1998). However, intuitively this prediction can be understood as people becoming more willing to put out the extra effort associated with a more effortful but more successful strategy when they are more motivated to succeed.

RCCL's second prediction is that this change in strategies may produce increases or decreases in base-rate sensitivity depending on whether the new or old strategies represent the
external alternative feature whose base-rate is being manipulated. As an abstract example (the next section presents a concrete example), suppose there is a strategy S1 that does represent an external feature F1 (i.e., S1 makes direct use of feature F1 to make a choice) and a strategy S2 that does not represent external feature F1 (i.e., S2 makes choices without making use of feature F1). Then, when people use strategy S1, they will be sensitive to the base-rates with which F1 predicts success, whereas when they use strategy S2, they will not be sensitive to the base-rates with which F1 predicts success. Thus, if increasing motivation leads people to move from S1 to S2, then base-rate sensitivity to F1 will go down. By contrast, if increasing motivation leads people to a move from S2 to S1, then base-rate sensitivity to F1 will go up. In general, for situations in which increases in motivation level cause a person to shift to a strategy that does not represent the relevant base-rate, then RCCL predicts decreases in base-rate sensitivity with increases in motivation level.

By contrast, non-strategy-based accounts would always predict an increase in base-rate sensitivity with increasing performance motivation. As the value of currently picking the best option increases, one should find better base-rate sensitivity (or even over-matching). Intuitively, the more incentive one has to do well, the more one pays attention to cues (e.g., base-rates) that will predict accurate choices.

The role of performance motivation in base-rate sensitivity and strategy adaptivity is also an important question for other reasons. Recent research (Schunn, Lovett, & Reder, 2001; Schunn & Reder, 1998, 2001) has shown that there are individual differences in the degree to which people adapt their strategies to shifting base-rates of success, and that these base-rate sensitivity individual differences are correlated with individual differences in inductive reasoning skill. A remaining question, however, is whether these individual differences in base-rate sensitivity can also be partially explained by motivational differences (i.e., are the more base-rate sensitive participants simply the more motivated ones). The current research will show the degree to which base-rate sensitivity is influenced by motivation levels and thus whether there is a potential confound in the individual differences research in this area.

**METHODS**

**Overview**

An experiment was conducted that presented participants with a problem-solving task that was expected to fall in the complex problem-solving situation, and then motivation and base-rate were manipulated. Thus, it was predicted that participants would 1) show changes in strategies as a result of motivation manipulations, and 2) change base-rate sensitivity depending on whether the new strategies encoded features relevant to the base-rate manipulation.
Participants

Ninety-two George Mason University undergraduates participated for course credit and were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. Nine participants encountered technical difficulties with the computer setup, and their data are not included in the analyses.

Building Sticks Task

In the building sticks task, participants are presented with 3 different-sized building sticks which they must choose among to create a given goal stick. To achieve the goal stick, participants add or subtract any combination of the buildings sticks provided.

For a given BST problem, using one of two approaches will result in the goal stick (Note, here I use the term "approach" to refer to an externally-defined alternative in contrast to a true strategy). Using the undershoot approach, participants start with a stick shorter than the goal stick and add to it to achieve the desired stick length. In the overshoot approach, participants pick a stick longer than the goal stick and subtract from it until the goal stick is created. Each problem is designed to be solved using one of the approaches, but not both.

For example, if the goal stick provided is 8 units in length and the 3 sticks A, B, and C, are 15, 6, 7, respectively, using the overshoot approach will solve this problem. To achieve the goal stick, participants start with stick A and subtract stick C \( (15 - 7 = 8) \) to reach the solution. Using the undershoot approach in this case would never result in the desired stick length because picking stick B and adding to it will not equal 8 \( (B + C = 6 + 7 = 13) \). Note that participants in the task are not given numerical lengths of the sticks. Instead, participants must estimate stick lengths and determine which sticks would lead to the goal stick before taking the appropriate steps. As a result, participants were forced to implicitly apply an approach (overshoot/undershoot) to solve each problem without knowing in advance whether it would work.

Participants were given 80 BST problems to solve. Participants worked through each problem until the goal stick was achieved. If a solution was not reached within 5 moves or less, participants were asked to reset the problem and start over again until the goal stick was reached. Each problem was designed to be solved by only one of the two approaches.

In this task, base-rates were manipulated within-participants. For the first 40 problems, the overshoot approach was biased to be more successful in solving the problems than the undershoot approach, with 70% and 30% success rates for each approach, respectively. For the second 40 problems, the success rates were reversed, with the undershoot approach biased to be more successful 70% of the time. This sequence was held constant across conditions. Base-rate sensitivity in this task is the degree to which participants adapted their approach choices to this base-rate manipulation, and this measure is one of two primary dependent measures.
Why Motivation Only Sometimes Affects Base-Rate Sensitivity: …

**Undershoot Closer**

- Desired: [](#)
- Current: [](#)
- Building: [a][b][c]

**Overshoot Closer**

- Desired: [](#)
- Current: [](#)
- Building: [a][b][c]

*Figure 1.* Examples of Undershoot looking (top) and Overshoot looking (bottom) BST problems.

In addition, each problem was designed with a feature pattern, called a relative length cue, which was predictive of the correct approach to use for a given goal stick. One of the 3 building sticks was designed to appear closer in length to the goal stick, suggesting a bias towards use of one approach over another. As shown in the top of Figure 1, stick C looks closest in length to the goal stick. Therefore, participants are more likely to start with stick C (initiating the undershoot approach) and adding segments until the desired stick length is reached. In contrast, stick B in the bottom of Figure 1 looks closer in length to the goal stick than sticks A and C. Thus, participants will pick stick B and subtract segments until the goal stick is achieved.

Of the 80 BST problems, 40 problems appeared biased towards overshoot and 40 problems were biased towards undershoot. This cue was manipulated to be successful 70% of the time—the predictiveness of the relative length cue remained constant across both conditions. Table 1 summarizes how problem types were manipulated over time for all participants (in both conditions)—overshoot success rate being changed over time, while the predictiveness of the length cue was held constant over time.

*Table 1. Overshoot success rate and predictiveness of the length cue over blocks of trials (in both conditions).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Predictive cue</th>
<th>Trials 1-40</th>
<th>Trials 41-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overshoot success rate</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Predictiveness of length cue</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Consistent with the RCCL account, participants in the BST tend to report a variety of strategies (Lovett & Schunn, 1999). The two most salient strategies are the hill-climbing and exclusive strategies. In the hill-climbing strategy, participants compare the goal stick to the building sticks and select the stick that most closely matches the length of the goal stick. In the exclusive strategy, participants simply select one approach, overshoot or undershoot, without regard to which appears to be closest to the goal. As long as hill-climbing distance is predictive of solution success (as it was in the current experiment), the hill-climbing strategy...
is more likely to be successful than the exclusive strategy. However, the hill-climbing strategy also involves more effort because of the visual comparison component. Thus, there is a tradeoff between success and effort, and where a given participant sits in their choice of strategy is likely to reflect their motivation levels. Which strategy participants adopt across motivation conditions will be the second primary dependent measure.

This task is a complex problem-solving situation (according to the definition given in the introduction) because there is not a simple mapping between strategies and external alternatives. Table 2 presents the choices that participants would tend to make in each of the blocks under the hill-climbing and exclusive strategies. The exclusive strategy should tend to select the most successful approach regardless of what the problem looked like. By contrast, the hill-climbing strategy should tend to select approaches according to problem appearance, independent of the base-rate of success of each approach. In other words, participants using the exclusive strategy should be sensitive to the base-rate manipulation of overshoot vs. undershoot success rates, whereas the participants using the hill-climbing strategy should not be sensitive to the base-rate manipulation because the hill-climbing strategy does not encode the problems that way.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Trials 1-40</th>
<th>Trials 41-80</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>O-biased</td>
<td>U-biased</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hill-climbing</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>U</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>O</td>
<td>O</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Table 2. Expected modal approach (O=overshoot, U=undershoot) under each strategy in each block for undershoot and overshoot biased problems.**

**Procedure**

Participants were randomly assigned to one of two conditions. In the Unpaid condition (the control group), participants received course credit only. In the Paid condition (the motivated group), participants received compensation in addition to course credit. Payment was based on a $10 scale and calculated to be $10 times the proportion of problems solved correctly within 5 steps or less. That is, participants who solved 80% of the problems in so few steps received $8.00 while participants who solved 60% of the problems in this way received $6.00.

At the beginning of the experiment, a computer tutorial provided participants with step-by-step instructions to the task, along with an animated demonstration of the undershoot and overshoot approaches. For participants in the Paid condition, the last page of the instructions informed the participants that they were being compensated for their participation based on their performance on the task. The instructor reiterated this compensation procedure to ensure participant motivation.
Predictions

The hill-climbing strategy is a more successful but more effortful strategy than the exclusive strategy. Therefore, RCCL predicts that the motivation manipulation should increase the participants' use of the hill-climbing strategy. Let us define base rate sensitivity as the difference in frequency of overshoot approach use from the first to second halves of the experiment. Then, because the exclusive strategy is more sensitive to the base-rates of overshoot and undershoot, RCCL predicts no effect of the motivation manipulation (or perhaps a decrease) on base-rate sensitivity, at least as defined in terms of external choices. By contrast, non-representational accounts (and perhaps even common sense) would suggest that the participants given the performance incentive should show greater base-rate sensitivity.

Strategy Coding

At the end of the Building Sticks Task, participants were asked about what strategies they used. As was found previously, there are a number of strategies that one can report (Lovett & Schunn, 1999). Responses were classified into one of 5 categories: using whatever the problem looked like (hill-climbing), always using one stick size first (exclusive), using what worked previously (memory), randomly selecting sticks (trial and error), and other strategies (miscellaneous). Based on a recoding of 20% of the data by a second coder, the reliability for this coding scheme was 93%.

RESULTS & DISCUSSION

Verifying Differences in Strategy Features

The predictions of strategy shifts rest on assumptions about the differential effort and success rates associated with the various strategies. The assumptions were tested by examining the relationship between first-mentioned strategy and participant mean success rates (across all blocks) and mean time to make the first move on each trial (across all blocks). Note that time to execute the strategy is used as an approximation of the effort required by a strategy. One would expect that the participants using the hill-climbing strategy should be more successful and require less time to make choices. However, given that participants in this task have been found to typically each use several strategies during the course of the session (Lovett & Schunn, 1999), one would expect analyses averaging performance data across the whole session to show somewhat diluted trends.
Overall, there was a significant effect of first mentioned strategy on the mean success rates, $F(2,54)=8.8$, MSE=$0.004$, $p<.005$ (see Figure 2). Specifically, exclusive strategies ($n=10$) showed lower success rates than hill-climbing strategies ($n=46$). This trend was consistent within both conditions.

Overall, the timing data was more variable, with a non-significant overall effect of first mentioned strategy on the mean times to make the first move $F(2,54)=2.1$, MSE=$1.31$, $p>.15$ (see Figure 3). However, exclusive strategies did show the expected lower mean times than did hill-climbing strategies. This trend was consistent within both conditions.
In sum, the assumptions about the differential effort and success rates between the hill-climbing and exclusive strategies were at least qualitatively supported.

**Strategy Changes**

It was expected that there would be change in the strategy usage across conditions. Specifically, it was expected that the frequency of the more effortful but more successful hill-climbing strategy would increase in the Paid condition. Table 3 presents the frequency of mention of each strategy type based on the first strategy mention. There is in fact the predicted increase in the use of hill-climbing strategy and the predicted decrease in the use of the exclusive strategy.

Note also that the Memory strategy, a relatively effort-intensive strategy, showed an increase in the Paid condition, and that the Trial & Error strategy, a relatively effort free strategy showed a decrease in the Paid condition. The predicted increase in reliance on effortful strategies was statistically significant, t(81)=1.6, p<.05 (one-tailed).

While these effects were not large, it is important to note that these analyses are likely to be an underestimate of the effects—participants did not indicate how often they used the mentioned strategies, and they most typically did report multiple strategies.

**Table 3. Proportion of participants mentioning each strategy within each condition.**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Unpaid (N=42)</th>
<th>Paid (N=41)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hill climbing</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Memory</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trial &amp; Error</td>
<td>0.17</td>
<td>0.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Misc.</td>
<td>0.07</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A secondary issue related to RCCL is whether motivation has an impact on the degree of search for an optimal strategy. RCCL predicts that participants will attempt to search for new strategies when they are unsatisfied with the current levels of success. One might expect that motivation levels would enter into the decision as to whether to search for alternative strategies. Towards this end, I examined the effect of condition on number of different strategies mentioned. There was no significant effect of condition on the number of strategies mentioned, F(1,81)<1. Both the Paid and Unpaid participants mentioned a mean of 1.4 strategies per participant.
Overall Base-Rate Changes Over Time

Both groups showed a rise in the amount of Overshoot use in the first half followed by a drop in the second half $F(3,243)=16.6$, MSE=0.015, $p<.0001$ (see Figure 4). There was no main effect of condition, $F(1,81)<1$, nor was there a significant interaction, $F(3,243)=1.0$, MSE=0.015, $p>.3$. To directly quantify the influence of condition on base-rate adaptivity, one can define base-rate adaptivity as the amount of drop in Overshoot use from the first half to the second half (difference of half means). On that measure, both Paid and Unpaid participants shifted exactly 7% in their use of Overshoot over time. As Figure 4 reveals, if anything, Paid participants were less sensitive to the base-rates. Thus, as predicted by RCCL, motivation manipulations produced changes in strategy use, not changes in base-rate sensitivity.

![Figure 4](image.png)

**Figure 4.** Proportion of overshoot choices within each set of twenty trials within each condition.

Hill-Climbing Sensitivity

One can also analyze the effects of problem appearance (whether the problem appearance was biased towards overshoot or biased towards undershoot) on solution method and its interaction with condition and blocks. As one always finds in this task, there are large effect of problem appearance on the proportion of overshoot selections, $F(1,81)=657.0$, MSE=0.038, $p<.0001$. More interestingly, there was also a significant interaction of appearance with condition, $F(1,81)=6.5$, MSE=0.038, $p<.02$. In particular, Unpaid participants showed a significantly lower sensitivity to problem appearance than did the Paid participants (49% versus 60% differences between overshoot-biased and undershoot-biased problem types).
Figure 5. Proportion of overshoot choices as a function of problem appearance (Overshoot biased vs. Undershoot biased) and condition (Paid vs. Unpaid), for the first (1) and second (2) halves of the experiment.

This effect establishes that the payment manipulation did have some influence on participants, and thus clarifies the interpretation of the null effects on base-rate sensitivity. This effect is also consistent with increases in hill-climbing strategy use as a result of the manipulation.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

This experiment found that increasing motivation levels can produce strategy changes (as measured by self-report and patterns in choice) without producing changes in base-rate sensitivity. The changes in strategy choice were consistent with a shift in motivation levels—a shift from lower-success/lower-effort strategies to higher-success/higher-effort strategies. Thus, the key predictions of the RCCL framework with respect to the effects of motivation levels on choice patterns were met. These findings are not consistent, by contrast, with non-strategy-based theories of choice that focus entirely on external alternatives rather than internal representations and strategies.

It should be noted that RCCL is a general framework, not a detailed model. With respect to the predictions regarding the effects of motivation, there are several particular utility-based strategy models of choice processes that could be used to account for the obtained results, including ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998), SAC (Schunn et al., 1997), and ASCM (Siegler & Shipley, 1995).

Some of the results of the current experiment are potentially difficult to interpret because they involve null effects of a manipulation. However, the manipulation did produce some effects demonstrating that it was strong enough to influence behavior. Moreover, it is somewhat rare to find a case in which performance in a problem-solving task does not
improve when undergraduates normally taking part only for course credit are suddenly paid for higher performance levels.

The current experiment is also not the first to find no effect of motivation manipulations on base-rate sensitivity. For example, Goodie and Fantino (1995) found no effect of a motivation manipulation on base-rate sensitivity. They also used conditions of course credit and pay versus course credit alone, although they paid their participants as much as $40. While Goodie and Fantino did not explain their null result (it was also not the focus of their experiment), RCCL provides a potential explanation. The key is to examine whether the motivation manipulation produced changes in strategy use rather than changes in choices at the level of simple external alternatives. While the task used by Goodie and Fantino was not obviously a complex problem-solving task, Lovett and Schunn (1999) established that participants do use a wide variety of strategies during that choice task as well.

Another consequence of the current experimental findings is that they resolve a question about individual differences. In particular, previous research on individual differences in sensitivity to base rates (Schunn & Reder, 1998; Stanovich & West, 1998) left open the possibility that the differences were due to motivational differences. The current research suggests that the observed individual differences in base-rate sensitivity are not so easily attributed to motivational differences.

The current experimental findings also permit some refining of the RCCL framework. RCCL posits that people will search for new representations and strategies when the success rates of the current alternatives are too low. An open question was whether motivational levels entered into determining when a search for new representations and strategies was begun. The current findings suggest that motivation levels do not have a large role of in the amount of search for alternative representations and strategies. Or, at least, all of the participants were sufficiently motivated to conduct such searches.

As a final note, the current experiment only manipulated one kind of motivation: extrinsic motivation. There are other types of motivation. For example, research (Button, Mathieu, & Zajac, 1996) has shown that people also differ in terms of their performance motivation (the degree to which they need to succeed) and learning motivation (the degree to which people prefer to learn new things). It is an open question whether those dimensions of motivation will have similar influences on choices processes generally, and base-rate sensitivity in particular.
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